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COMPARATIVE RESEARCH AND UNIFICATION
OF LAW*

Hessel E. Yntemat

T

HE current interest in international unification of law as a major
objective of comparative legal research is significant testimony, in
an era of accentuated nationalism, to the. increasing solidarity of the
modern world. In the development of this interest, Latin America has
played a pioneer role. As early as 1826, the celebrated Congress convened at Panama envisaged in its deliberations what one of its members
termed a "System of Public Law" for the Americas.1 The Congress of
Montevideo of 188 8-188 9, anticipated by the Lima Congress of J urists of 1878, produced the first substantial and successful codification
of private international law, comprized in eight treaties and recently
revised.2 Together with the C6digo Bustamante, this consolidation of
the rules of private international law constitutes a notable instance of
the spirit of legal unity flourishing in the Americas.
Since 1889, the successive conferences of the American States held
under the auspices of the Pan-American Union have constantly promoted in numerous recommendations the codification and unification
of those international branches of law that vitally concern peace and
commerce in the Americas. The most recent of these conferences, held
at Lima in 193-8, has established an impressive organization of existing
agencies for the progressive codification of international law, including
in addition to the Committee of Experts and the International Conference of Jurists, a national committee for each State and four permanent
committees appointed to consider; respectively, public international
law, private international law, comparative legislation and the unification of legislation, and the unification of civil and commercial laws.

* Address delivered at the first meeting of the Inter-American Bar Association,
Havana, Cuba, March 25, 1941. The preferences of the author as to style have been
followed throughout.-Ed.
Professor of Law, University of Michigan; United States member of the Permanent Committee of Habana on Comparative Legislation and the Unification . of
Legislation.-Ed.
1 Cf. 13 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 993 {1848).
2 For a contemporary description of the Montevideo treaties, see Pradier-Fodere,
"Le congres de droit international sud-americain et les traites de Montevideo," 21
REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPARE 217, 561 {1889).
The recent revision is discussed by Rabel, "The Revision of the Treaties of Montevideo
on the Law of Conflicts," 39 MrcH. L. REV. 517 (1941).
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This organization provides an eminently practical procedure for the
consideration and approval of projects to harmonize the laws in this
hemisphere. As such, it constitutes an invitation to comparative research
on the part of jurists and a challenge to the bar in each State.
If it were necessary to demonstrate that the objectives of this organization are attainable, allusion could be made to the profound influence
that the American Bar Association has exercised upon the course of
uniform legislation in the United States. Prior to the formation of the
Association in 1878 in order, among other things, "to promote uniformity of legislation throughout the Union," 8 a crying need had developed
to unify various branches of commercial law, but there was no effective
mobilization of available forces to meet the need. The activities of the
Association, to instance but a few of its achievements, have inspired the
creation of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1892, which has since drafted and effectively promoted
the adoption of uniform laws on a variety of subjects in the several
States, as well as the enactment of the Federal Bankruptcy Act of 1898
and the recent adoption by the Supreme Court of uniform rules of procedure in civil cases, an event that is destined to have large influence in
promoting uniformity of practice. In addition, a committee of the association prepared the way for the establishment in 1923 of the American
Law Institute, which has now substantially completed the Restatement
of the common law, affording a basis for the eventual consolidation of
the vast mass of precedents covering the more important branches of
private law.
This example suggests the possibility of an analogous development
on the larger platform of the unification of Inter-American law. As
such unification will necessarily presuppose comparative study, it seems
therefore appropriate to define the criteria of this type of legal research
and to estimate their significance for the work of unifi<;ation. It is well
to scan the lines before essaying the part.
-Comparative legal research, to which then we may briefly refer,
essentially imports more adequate methods of scientifio-investigation in
the field of law.4 The historical and analytical modes ·of thought that
superseded the natural law rationalism of the Age of Enlightenment
have accustomed us to conceive legal problems in positive terms, to
8

Constitution of the American Bar Association, Article I,

1

A. B. A.

REP.

30 (1878).
4 For more extensive discussion and .references, see Yntema, "Roman Law as the
Basis of Comparative Law," in 2 LAw; A CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1835-1935,
346 at 364 ff. (1937).
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regard law as eminently traditional and territorial, an expression of
national culture embodied in the fiat of a sovereign state. That this
positivistic point of view is advantageous to regulate the administration
of justice and to systematize existing law, is obvious; as contrasted with
natural law theories, it has the great virtue of focussing upon the actual
rules and particulars of each legal system instead of vague universal
abstractions.
And positivism is sufficient when the times are self-sufficient. But,
for an epoch of change, when social conditions and ideals are subjected
to critical inquiry, when the agencies of communication are multiplying
the relations among the peoples of the world, whether of peace or of
war, and economic unities transcend ancient political boundaries, the
tenets of positivism are inadequate in at least two respects. In the first
place, its emphasis upon existing law furnishes no light to guide ine.;.itable change; the vital decisions which control the future legal order are
without its scope and have to be made empirically in the obscure processes of legislation and administration. In the second place, the prevalent
notion that law follows the flag is not congruous with the true conception of science. Comparison, Munroe Smith stated some time since, "is
preeminently the scientific method.... A science of English law or of
Anglo-American law is as inconceivable as a science of Anglo-American
ethics or economics." 5 As C. K. Allen has justly observed, comparative
law is not a body of law in a positive sense but a method of scientific
inquiry.0 It represents an effort to transcend the limitations of both the
natural law and positivistic points of view, to approach legal problems,
as it were, from without,, from a cosmopolitan, actualistic, and therefore
relatively objective, standpoint. Far from ignoring the peculiar conditions and techniques of each legal system, it seeks to explain and unify
them in general terms predicated upon compari~on with corresponding
items in other systems. Confessedly, its purpose is ultimately practical,
as its spirit is scientific.
It would lead too far afield for this occasion to sketch the historical
background or to analyze the logical implications of the foregoing attenuated suggestions, or even to consider cursorily the conceptions that
have inspired the recent development of comparative law, such, for
5 Munroe Smith, "Roman Law in American La'l'.I' Schools," 45 (36 N. S.) AM. L.
REG. & REv. 175 at 182, 183 (1897), reprinted in MUNROE SMITH, A GENERAL
Vrnw OF EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY 256 at 263, 264 (1927).
6 Allen, "Jurisprudence-What and Why?" 42 JURIDICAL REVIEW 275 at 287
(1930), reprinted in ALLEN, LEGAL DUTIES I at 12 (1931).
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example, as Maine's comparative-historical method, Saleilles' idealistic
thesis of natural law with variable content as the object of comparative
investigation, Lambert's legislative common law, Rahel's systematicdogmatic comparative law as distinguished from ethnological jurisprudence and historical comparison, and the like.
It is, however, pertinent to note the common denominators in such
conceptions, as. indicating essential considerations to be borne in mind
in connection with efforts to promote the unification of law. In the first
place, the method of inquiry commonly proposed is objective; comparative law is considered an historical or factual study requiring extensive observation and comparison of legal phenomena. In the second
place, as has been stressed notably by the two chief exponents of comparative law in recent years in France and Germany, Edouard Lambert
and° Ernst Rabel, the inquiry is functional. That is to say, comparative
law endeavors to relate legal rules and institutions according to their
social and economic operation and significance, and not merely in their
formal aspects in the manner of analytical jurisprudence. In the third
place, in contrast to the earlier surveys of so-called comparative legislation, emphasis is laid upon systematic analysis, upon law instead of laws,
or, in other words, upon the necessity of considering legal institutions
in the context of the legal systems of which they form part. Finally, it
has been. recognized in recent years that, to avoid futile diffusion of
effort, comparative legal research must concentrate upon a limited number of comparable legal systems; the sterile hypothesis of positivism is
commonly rejected, and an ideal basis, confirmed by scientific comparison, is sought to synthesize the diverse legal systems that have divided
the allegiance of the civilized world.
It is true that comparative law has typically been advocated for
local purposes. The use of foreign legal materials as a source of models
for legislation elsewhere has been doubtless the predominant, as it was
apparently the earliest, form of comparative legal study. In this connection, it is of interest to recall that Lycurgus. and Solon are said to
have framed their laws after foreign prototypes and that the revival
of interest in comparative legislation in the nineteenth century had
chiefly this consideration in view. It has also frequently been observed
that, comparative legal studies form an effective means not only to
obtain ,some appreciation of foreign legal systems but more especially
to inculcate a more penetrating insight into the system in which the
student is trained. In addition, Beckett, Rabel, and others have recently
developed a school of thought that looks to comparative law for the
solution of the difficult problems arising in conflicts of laws involving
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divergent legal concepts, the so-called problems of qualification or
characterization. In these directions, comparative law can perform obvious services. But its peculiar and most significant purpose, to which
these are relative, is the unification of law. This brings us to the second
phase of the subject matter under discussion.
·
This purpose, it may be observed in the first place, is fairly analogous, in kind if not in prospective scope, to a trend that has characterized
the evolution since the fall of the Roman Empire within the several
legal systems of the civilized world, namely, the fusion of local laws
into larger legal unities more nearly corresponding to practical needs.
In England, the subordination of local customs started in the twelfth
century through the creation of a central system of justice. In Spain,
in the following century, they were superseded in large part by Las
Siete Partidas. In France, the process of unification, measurably advanced by the end of the sixteenth century through the reception of
the custom of Paris as a subsidiary common law, was completed in the
Code Napoleon. In the Low Countries and Germany, the reception of
Roman law culminating in the sixteenth century led to a fusion of this
alien system with' the local Germanic customs in the so-called Pandectenrecht that has in turn formed the basis of more recent codes. In the
United States during the past century, there has been an analogous integration of diversified elements with the received English law, a
process profoundly influenced in recent years by the national law
schools, by the adoption of uniform state laws, and by the expansion
of Federal legislation.
If these familiar histories lend countenance to the thesis of comparative law, not yet adequately proved, that comparable legal institutions
appear under comparable conditions so as to warrant the possibility of
eventual unification of law in larger areas, they do not lend the hope
of its easy or e;i,rly accomplishment under normal conditions. Even in
limited national units with a common cultural background and under
the stimulus of political unity, unification of law has been a long and
often incomplete process. It would also seem that certain general conditions are congenial to the process: first, the existence of a felt community of interests, usually but not always marked by corresponding
political organization; second, a sufficient preparation of the bases of
unification, a condition which supposes that the elements to be unified
have reached the requisite stage of precipitation; and third, an appropriate procedure or organization to implement the pro~ss. In other words,
although under stress of necessity, local laws have at times been superseded by novel uniform legislation, typically there is required sufficient
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comparative understanding of the laws to be unified, as well as an a'dequate motive and an effective machine.
These remarks may be supplemented by a few practical suggestions
respecting the technique of unification. In the first place, it is obviously
desirable to encourage more intensive development of comparative legal
studies. Thereby the attention of a larger number of the members of
the bar will be attracted to the legal problems of other countries and a
basis for m~tual. understanding extended. Moreover, such a development will increase the too limited group of individuals interested and
qualified to undertake the comparative research requisite for the unification of law.
In the second place, as H. C. Gutteridge has pointed out,7 the
work of unification has thre~ distinct phases that should be kept separate, namely, the preliminary comparative study of the subject matter
to be unified, the formulation of concrete proposals for unification, and
the official diplomatic or legislative implementation of such proposals.
As appropriate official agencies exist for the last two of these, further
comment may be limited to the first phase of preliminary investigation.
This will necessarily involve comparative analysis of the pertinent rules
of law as they·actually operate in the respective legal systems, and determination of the extent to which there are divergencies in the rules
in question and the extent to which such divergencies, viewed in the
light of the business practices and legal procedures in which the rules
function, are significant. For this species of research more or less independent individual ,investigation is indicated, supplemented by suitable
facilities to obtain the necessary data.
In the third place, it •is worth emphasizing in this connection that
unification of law has very practical aspects. It involves more than a
theoretical synthesis of existing law. It is not necessary to emphasize·
before lawyers, for example, that the bar is peculiarly and justly sensitive about possible changes in legal procedure; for this reason, specific
account should be taken in the study of unification of possible difficulties on this score. The same counsel applies to the interests of the business and commercial world that may be affected. In short, the subject
matter must be studied, not merely in abstracto, but from a functional
point of view.
This leads, in the fourth place, to the suggestion that, at least in
the initial stages, it will be eminently wise to limit an effort to harmo7 Gutteridge, "The Technique of the Unification of Private Law," 1939 BRITISH
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 at 42.
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nize laws affecting a number of states to what is feasible as respects both
subject matter and sphere of application. Thus, while it would be
apparently advantageous to unify certain aspects of commercial law,
there are other branches of law that distinctly involve local beliefs
and customs, such, for example, as those affecting family relations,
which there is no occasion to disturb. On the other hand, it will be expedient to limit a program of international unification to the international aspects or applications of the laws to be harmonized. The alternative, occasionally proffered, is to standardize each subject for domestic
as well as international purposes. Obviously, such a utopian scheme
would greatly and gratuitously increase the difficulties, formidable
enough at best, in the path of international unificationandevenjeopardize its progress. For example, in a federal union such as the United
States, the adhesion of the several States as well as the Federal Government would presumably be required to give effect to proposals concerning matters within the province of state legislation. If not required,
thei'r adhesion would at least be a just condition. Nor is it justifiable
under the given conditions to attempt to unify domestic laws except
for international purposes. Such restriction of the unification program
to the international applications of the respective laws would concentrate effort where it is appropriate and at the same time furnish a model
for the eventual further assimilation of the domestic laws as may in the
future appear requisite.
These few comments respecting the technique of unification of law
may be concluded with the obvious recommendation that, in the process,
account should be taken of comparable developments elsewhere. The
more so, as the laws of the Americas stem from the streams of European legal culture and form part, but only part, of the complex of
institutions that regulate the commerce of the world.
There is a saying that the twentieth century belongs to the Americas.8 As the reverberations of war roll across the oceans, the saying may
prove true, provided that, in the development of our material resources
and the amelioration of social conditions on these continents, the ideals
of justice, liberty, and peace, which characterize civilization, are maintained. In the presence in this New World of the two dominant legal
cultures, the Anglo-American, represented by the Dominion of Canada
and the United States, and the Romanic by the Latin-American States,
8 Thus, Pradier-Fodere, "Le congres de droit international sud-americain et les
traites de Montevideo," 21 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION

COMPARE 217 (1889).
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lies a singular opportunity to contribute to these ends. A reconciliation
of the laws regulating Inter-American relations, predicated upon these
two systems and stimulating fruitful exchanges of ideas, which incorporates the highest and most humane principles of justice, is calculated
to stir the imagination of the bar in every State. It is an enterprise which
will impressively promote the development of culture and commerce
. and further consolidate the solidarity of the Americas. Its accomplishment will stand as an exemplar of the possibility of peaceful prog. ress in a world at war.

